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PROSECUTING  CORRUPTION  AFTER
MCDONNELL  V.  UNITED  STATES
Terence A. Parker*
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the final day of October Term 2015 was a major blow to
the fight against public corruption.  “The Bob McDonnell Supreme Court
ruling makes convicting politicians of corruption almost impossible,” read a
headline in the Washington Post.1  The New York Times, anticipating down-
stream effects of the decision in McDonnell v. United States,2 wrote: “Supreme
Court Complicates Corruption Cases From New York to Illinois.”3  The Wall
Street Journal, noting the potential impact on pending high-profile corruption
cases, wrote that the decision “could make it harder for prosecutors to bring
cases against public officials.”4  These newspaper articles are only a tiny sam-
ple of the coverage dedicated to the Supreme Court’s reversal of former Vir-
ginia Governor Bob McDonnell’s corruption convictions.5  Yet these articles
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2015.  I would like to thank Professor Jimmy
Gurulé for his guidance and comments, and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for
their tireless editing.  Most of all, I would like to thank my parents for their endless support
and love.  All errors are my own.
1 Chris Cillizza, The Bob McDonnell Supreme Court Ruling Makes Convicting Politicians of
Corruption Almost Impossible, WASH. POST (June 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/27/the-bob-mcdonnell-scotus-ruling-proves-that-its-al
most-impossible-to-convict-politicians-of-corruption/?utm_term=.022989fcd793.
2 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
3 Eric Lipton & Benjamin Weiser, Supreme Court Complicates Corruption Cases From New
York to Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/
politics/supreme-court-complicates-corruption-cases-from-new-york-to-illinois.html.
4 Brent Kendall, Supreme Court’s Bob McDonnell Ruling Could Affect Other Corruption
Cases, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-courts-bob-
mcdonnell-ruling-could-affect-other-corruption-cases-1467042298.
5 See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Overturns Bob McDonnell’s Corruption Convictions,
POLITICO (June 27, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/supreme-court-over-
turns-bob-mcdonnells-corruption-convictions-224833; Amy Davidson Sorkin, The Supreme
Court’s Bribery-Blessing McDonnell Decision, NEW YORKER (June 27, 2016), https://www.new
yorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-supreme-courts-bribery-blessing-mcdonnell-decision.
959
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illustrate a widespread concern that the McDonnell decision would make
securing bribery convictions significantly more difficult.6
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court addressed as a matter of statutory
interpretation what actions constitute an “official act”—a necessary element
for proving honest services wire fraud and Hobbs Act extortion.7  In answer-
ing this question, the Court held that taking meetings, making phone calls,
and hosting events, by themselves, could not satisfy the statute’s official act
requirement.8  The question now, with more than two years of hindsight, is
whether these fears were well founded.  Has McDonnell, as so many feared,
made it nearly impossible for prosecutors to bring public corruption cases?
The answer from the lower courts, at both the circuit and district levels,
appears to be that McDonnell has had a limited impact.
This Note analyzes a series of federal corruption cases brought around
the time of the McDonnell decision, to discern patterns in how lower courts
have interpreted McDonnell, and how federal prosecutors have altered their
strategies in its aftermath.  In particular, this Note focuses on three high-
profile public corruption cases.9  Two of these cases involve convictions that
occurred immediately preceding the McDonnell decision, and whose subse-
quent appeals relied heavily on the Court’s holding in McDonnell.10  The
third case, the prosecution of U.S. Senator Robert Menendez from New
Jersey, involves a trial that occurred wholly after the McDonnell decision.11
Though these are not the only lower court cases to analyze McDonnell, they
are representative of the high-profile corruption cases that commentators
feared would be impossible in the aftermath of the decision.
These cases represent the lower courts’ first attempts to apply McDonnell.
The McDonnell doctrine will continue to develop with time, however the nar-
row official act definition has not had the dramatic effect the commentators
suggested.  This Note makes three arguments derived from post-McDonnell
caselaw.  The first is that the Court’s definition of official act will only make a
difference in a narrow subset of public corruption cases, leaving prosecutions
in most others relatively unchanged by the decision.12  Second, the Court’s
holding in McDonnell did not, as some have argued, foreclose prosecutions
under a “stream of benefits”13 theory of corruption.14  Third, and finally, the
6 Matt Ford, Has the Supreme Court Legalized Public Corruption?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 19,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/menendez-mcdonnell-
supreme-court/543354/.
7 “Official act” is defined in the federal bribery statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)
(2012).  In McDonnell, the parties agreed that the federal bribery statute would govern the
definition of official act in the honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion counts. See
infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
8 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2374–75 (2016).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part III.
13 Under a “stream of benefits” theory of bribery, the bribe does not have to be paid in
exchange for a contemporaneous specific official act.  Instead, the quid pro quo can be
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chief barrier that prosecutors encounter is unchanged by McDonnell’s hold-
ing—that is, proving corrupt intent.15
This Note proceeds in five Parts.  Part I provides a background discus-
sion of the facts and holding in McDonnell.  Part II goes on to analyze McDon-
nell through the lens of three recent federal public corruption cases,
discussing how the decision has been applied to both specific act and stream
of benefits prosecutions.  Part III argues that the narrower official acts defini-
tion announced by the McDonnell Court will not result in a sea change to
corruption prosecutions.  Part IV argues for the resilience of the stream of
benefits theory of public corruption in the aftermath of McDonnell.  Finally,
Part V argues that proving corrupt intent is still the primary obstacle to fed-
eral prosecutors, not a shift in the law caused by McDonnell.
I. MCDONNELL V. UNITED STATES
On January 21, 2014, federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia announced a fourteen-count indictment against former Virginia Gover-
nor Robert McDonnell and his wife, Maureen McDonnell.16  The first eleven
counts of the indictment alleged that McDonnell “committed and conspired
to commit honest-services wire fraud and extortion under color of official
right.”17  The indictment represented one of the Department of Justice’s
most ambitious attempts to prosecute a public official for corruption in
decades.18  Up until the investigation that culminated in the indictment,
McDonnell was seen as a rising star in the Republican Party.19
proven through a pattern of bribes given to the public official, in exchange for the public
official taking official undetermined acts when necessary at a later time. See, e.g., United
States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998) (“The quid pro quo requirement is
satisfied so long as the evidence shows a ‘course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a
public official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to the donor.’”
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976))); see
also United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The key to whether a gift
constitutes a bribe is whether the parties intended for the benefit to be made in exchange
for some official action; the government need not prove that each gift was provided with
the intent to prompt a specific official act.”).
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See infra Part V.
16 United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783, 787 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, 792 F.3d
478 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).  The indictment alleged McDonnell
committed violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349 (honest services wire fraud); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a) (Hobbs Act extortion); and 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements). McDonnell, 136
S. Ct. at 2365.
17 McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 787.
18 See Trip Gabriel, Ex-Governor of Virginia Is Indicted on Charges Over Loans and Gifts,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/us/former-virginia-
governor-and-his-wife-are-indicted.html.
19 See Elizabeth Titus & Alexander Burns, McDonnell and Wife Indicted, POLITICO (Jan.
21, 2014), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/bob-mcdonnell-and-wife-indicted-vir-
ginia-102441 (“Once touted as a strong potential presidential candidate, McDonnell’s
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The charges stemmed from the former Governor’s relationship with Vir-
ginia businessman Jonnie Williams, who was the chief executive officer of
Star Scientific, a Virginia-based nutrition company.20  While in office, Gover-
nor McDonnell accepted “$175,000 in loans, gifts, and other benefits” from
Williams.21  Among the loans and gifts that federal prosecutors alleged repre-
sented bribes included a $20,000 shopping spree paid for by Williams for
Mrs. McDonnell; a $50,000 loan to cover the McDonnells’ real estate debts; a
$15,000 payment for wedding expenses for the McDonnells’ daughter; a
$2380.24 golf outing that Williams did not even attend; and a $6000–$7000
Rolex watch for Governor McDonnell.22  Far from being an exercise in gen-
erosity, prosecutors “sought to prove that [McDonnell] and his wife . . .
accepted [the] money and lavish gifts in exchange for efforts to assist [Star
Scientific] in securing state university testing of a dietary supplement the
company had developed.”23
At trial, the Government’s underlying theory for “both the honest ser-
vices fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges was that Governor McDonnell
had accepted bribes from Williams.”24  From the outset, the parties agreed
that the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, would govern the definition
of honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion.25  Thus, for both charges
prosecutors would be required to prove that Governor McDonnell took an
official act within the definition of the federal bribery statute.26  To satisfy
this requirement, prosecutors “alleged that Governor McDonnell committed
at least five ‘official acts’” in exchange for bribes from Williams.27  Over the
political stature rapidly diminished over the course of 2013 amid a deepening investigation
into [possible corruption].”).
20 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361.
21 Id.
22 See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487–90 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S.
Ct. 2355 (2016).  This is far from a complete list of the gifts, loans, and other benefits that
prosecutors alleged Williams gave to McDonnell.  In its opinion affirming Governor
McDonnell’s conviction, the Fourth Circuit discussed in meticulous detail the extent of
Williams’s gift giving to Governor and Mrs. McDonnell. See id. at 486–93; see also The
Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Leading Cases, 130 HARV. L. REV. 467, 467–68 (2016) [hereinaf-
ter Leading Cases].
23 McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 486; see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361.
24 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365 (first citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404
(2010); and then citing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260, 269 (1992)).
25 Id. The federal bribery statute makes it a crime when a public official or person
selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives,
accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person
or entity, in return for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official act.
18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012).
26 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365.  The bribery statute defines an official act as “any
decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which
may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in
such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”  18 U.S.C.
§ 201(a)(3).
27 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365.  The five alleged official acts were:
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course of the five-week jury trial, the evidence of these five alleged official
acts primarily involved McDonnell’s actions setting up meetings between Star
Scientific and state officials.28  Defense counsel argued that setting up meet-
ings with state officials or university researchers was the normal course of
business in the Governor’s office, and that McDonnell did not expect “his
staff ‘to do anything other than to meet’ with Williams.”29  In essence,
McDonnell’s defense was that these actions were exactly the kind of constitu-
ent services expected of public officials.
After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury that they
must find whether McDonnell “agreed ‘to accept a thing of value in
exchange for official action.’”30  The court then reiterated the five specific
official acts alleged in the indictment, and read the 18 U.S.C. § 201 defini-
tion of official act to the jury.31  Additionally, the court read the Govern-
ment’s requested instruction to the jury: “[T]he term encompassed ‘acts that
a public official customarily performs,’ including acts ‘in furtherance of
longer-term goals’ or ‘in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an
end.’”32  The court rejected McDonnell’s proposed instruction that “merely
arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or making a
speech” were insufficient to constitute an official act under § 201.33
(1) “arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government officials,
who were subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and promote Anatabloc”;
(2) “hosting, and . . . attending, events at the Governor’s Mansion designed
to encourage Virginia university researchers to initiate studies of anatabine and to
promote Star Scientific’s products to doctors for referral to their patients”;
(3) “contacting other government officials in the [Governor’s Office] as part
of an effort to encourage Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of
anatabine”;
(4) “promoting Star Scientific’s products and facilitating its relationships
with Virginia government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals
important to Star Scientific’s business to exclusive events at the Governor’s Man-
sion”; and
(5) “recommending that senior government officials in the [Governor’s
Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss ways that the company’s
products could lower healthcare costs.”
Id. at 2365–66 (alterations in original) (citing Indictment at ¶ 111, United States v.
McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 14-cr-12)). Anatabloc, or anatabine,
was the nutritional supplement developed by Williams’s company. See id. at 2362.
28 Id. at 2365–66.
29 Id. at 2366.
30 Id.  (quoting Supplemental Joint Appendix at 68, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No.
15-474).
31 Id.  The five alleged official acts “involved arranging meetings, hosting events, and
contacting other government officials.” Id.
32 Id. (quoting Supplemental Joint Appendix, supra note 30, at 70).
33 Id. (quoting United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 513 (4th Cir. 2015)) (noting
McDonnell’s proposed instruction was based on the argument that these actions did not
involve “matters pending before the government”).
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The jury convicted McDonnell on both the honest services fraud and
Hobbs Act extortion charges.34  McDonnell appealed to the Fourth Circuit
on the grounds (1) that the district court’s definition of official acts was
overly broad, (2) that the statutes of conviction were unconstitutionally
vague, and (3) that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain a
conviction.35  The court of appeals rejected McDonnell’s arguments, and
upheld the district court’s jury instructions.36
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to clarify the meaning of
official act, and reversed the Fourth Circuit.37  Writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the sweeping language used in the offi-
cial act jury instruction.38  The Court’s narrow interpretation of § 201(a)(3)
created two requirements for proving an official act.  First, the Government
“must identify a question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy
involving the formal exercise of governmental power.”39  Second, “the public
official must make a decision or take an action on that ‘question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,’ or agree to do so.”40  The second
prong can be satisfied if the official (1) makes a “decision or action on a
qualifying step” toward an official action,41 (2) uses his position to “exert
pressure” on another official to take an official act,42 or (3) advises another
official, “knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an
‘official act’ by [that] official.”43
The decision to narrow the definition of official act rested primarily on
the Court’s interpretation of the text of the federal bribery statute.44  Chief
Justice Roberts coupled the statutory interpretation with a discussion of the
Court’s decision in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California.45  That
case compelled the conclusion that “something more” is required before
“hosting an event, meeting with other officials, or speaking with interested
34 Id.  McDonnell was acquitted on the false statement charges. Id.
35 See id. at 2367.  The Fourth Circuit also addressed issues relating to severance, voir
dire, evidentiary rulings, and exclusion of expert testimony. See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 494,
496, 498, 499.  These issues, however, were not among those appealed to the Supreme
Court. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2367.
36 See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 486.
37 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361, 2375.
38 Id. at 2367–68 (“[W]e reject the Government’s reading of § 201(a)(3) and adopt a
more bounded interpretation of ‘official act.’  Under that interpretation, setting up a
meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event does not, standing alone, qual-
ify as an ‘official act.’”).
39 Id. at 2374 (internal quotations omitted).
40 Id. at 2372.
41 Id. at 2370.
42 Id. at 2372.
43 Id.; see also Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 475–76.
44 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368–70 (analyzing the text and structure of the federal
bribery statute).  For a discussion of Chief Justice Roberts’s narrow reading of the bribery
statute in McDonnell, see Pratik A. Shah, The Chief Justice and Statutory Construction: Holding
the Government’s Feet to the Fire, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 573, 579–82 (2016).
45 526 U.S. 398 (1999); see McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370 (discussing the case).
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parties” could constitute an official act.46  In addition to precedent, the
Court voiced concern for the constitutional implications of the Govern-
ment’s broad reading of § 201(a)(3).47  The Court feared such an interpreta-
tion of official act would have a chilling effect on democratic participation.48
Moreover, the Court noted that a broader interpretation raises both notice
and federalism concerns.49  These considerations further convinced the
Court that they should give effect to their interpretation of the bribery stat-
ute, and thus narrow the official acts definition.50
The Court then identified three instructions that the district court
should have given the jury.51  First, the trial judge should have instructed the
jury that they must identify a question or matter within the meaning of
§ 201(a)(3).52  Second, the district court should have instructed the jury that
the question or matter they identify must be something “specific and
focused” that either is, or will be, before the public official.53  Third, the
Court held that the jury should have been instructed that “merely” setting up
a meeting or hosting an event “does not count” as a decision on the identi-
fied question or matter.54
After suggesting these narrower official acts instructions, the Court
rejected McDonnell’s vagueness and insufficient evidence arguments.55
Chief Justice Roberts closed the opinion with an eye toward the inevitable
criticism the decision would receive.  The Court’s concern, he wrote, was with
the “broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless interpreta-
tion of the federal bribery statute” and “not with tawdry tales of Ferraris,
Rolexes, and ball gowns.”56  The final line of the opinion provided one assur-
ance: the narrow “interpretation of the term ‘official act’ leaves ample room
for prosecuting corruption.”57
The Chief Justice was correct in anticipating criticism of the decision.58
The assurance that prosecutors could still go after the crooked official was
46 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370.
47 See id. at 2372 (“In addition to being inconsistent with both text and precedent, the
Government’s expansive interpretation of ‘official act’ would raise significant constitu-
tional concerns.”).
48 See id.
49 See id. at 2373.
50 See id. at 2375 (“[This] more limited interpretation of the term ‘official act’ leaves
ample room for prosecuting corruption, while comporting with the text of the statute and
the precedent of this Court.”).
51 Id. at 2374–75.
52 Id. at 2374.
53 See id.
54 Id. at 2375.
55 See id. (stating that the vagueness concerns were alleviated by the narrower interpre-
tation, and that the insufficient evidence argument was something the court of appeals
would have to address on remand, in light of the new official acts definition).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 This is not to say that the reaction to the Court’s decision was across the board
negative.  To the contrary, several major news outlets published opinion pieces praising
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met with doubt from many commentators.  Criticism, however, ranged from
those who thought McDonnell signaled an age of legalized bribery,59 to those
who believed that the decision would require prosecutors to simply alter the
way they framed corruption cases.60  The remainder of this Note examines
whether these criticisms were well founded.
II. CORRUPTION CASES AFTER MCDONNELL
This Part of the Note focuses on three corruption cases that in whole or
in part occurred after the Court’s decision in McDonnell.  The use of these
cases does require an important caveat: only one of the cases referenced has
come to a decisive endpoint.  At the time of this writing, two of the three
cases examined in this part are ongoing, either on appeal at the circuit court
or back at the district court for retrial.  Despite the unsettled nature of these
cases, they provide valuable insight into how lower courts and prosecutors
are grappling with post-McDonnell corruption prosecutions.
A. United States v. Silver
On November 30, 2015, just under seven months prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in McDonnell, a jury in the Southern District of New York
convicted Sheldon Silver of honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion.61
Up until his indictment, Silver had been the powerful Speaker of the Assem-
bly in New York.62  The indictment alleged two schemes, each with the same
general structure: “[I]n exchange for official actions, Silver received bribes
and kickbacks in the form of referral fees from third-party law firms.”63  Sil-
ver was convicted on all seven counts against him, and sentenced to twelve
years of imprisonment.64  All of this occurred before the decision in McDonnell
v. United States.
the decision’s protection of the democratic process. See, e.g., Robert Gebelhoff, Why the




59 See, e.g., Davidson Sorkin, supra note 5; Josh Gerstein, McDonnell Ruling a Big Blow to
Corruption Law, POLITICO (June 27, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/
mcdonnell-ruling-seen-blessing-pay-to-play-224855.
60 See, e.g., Dante Ramos, Va. Ex-Governor Wins at Supreme Court, but Corruption Is Still
Illegal, BOS. GLOBE (June 27, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/06/27/
governor-wins-supreme-court-but-corruption-still-illegal/1UHYwo06otnV9wkXgU0gLJ/
story.html.
61 See United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 110–12 (2d Cir. 2017).
62 Id. at 106 (“As Speaker, Silver was one of the most powerful public officials in the
State of New York, exercising significant control over the Assembly and state legislative
matters.”).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 112.
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In post-trial motions, Silver sought to continue his release on bail and
stay other penalties, relying on the issues raised in the briefs and at oral argu-
ment in McDonnell.65  The district court, recognizing that McDonnell had
obvious implications for Silver’s case, granted the motion.66  After the
McDonnell decision and on appeal to the Second Circuit, Silver argued that
the jury instructions for the honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion in
his case were erroneous.67  Judge José Cabranes, writing for the three judge
panel, concluded that the instructions were in fact erroneous in light of
McDonnell, and vacated the conviction and remanded for retrial.68
In reaching this result, the court undertook a thorough examination of
the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell.  The district court’s official act
instruction “encompass[ed] any action taken or to be taken under color of
official authority.”69  This, the circuit court said, was “overbroad.”70  After
examining the record, the court only found one possible action by Silver,
within the statute of limitations, that fell under McDonnell’s narrow official
act definition.  This was a relatively meaningless Assembly resolution honor-
ing one of Silver’s conspirators.71
Of note, the court placed importance on the fact that “the District
Court’s charge did not contain any of the three instructions specified in
McDonnell.”72  This suggests that after McDonnell, district courts must include
all three limiting instructions in order for a conviction to survive appellate
review.  Courts of appeal, then, will look for these instructions as a threshold
matter.  Another takeaway from Silver is that McDonnell’s narrow official acts
definition applies even when the potential for a chilling effect on democratic
participation is wholly absent.  In McDonnell, the relationship between
McDonnell and Williams began with, at a minimum, the appearance of a
political backdrop.73  In contrast, the bribes to Silver were funneled to him
through his positions with law and real estate development firms.74  The
65 Id. at 113. McDonnell was argued before the Supreme Court on April 27, 2016. See
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2355 (2016).  The district court sentenced
Silver on May 4, 2016, and entered its final judgment on May 10, 2016. Silver, 864 F.3d at
112–13.
66 Silver, 864 F.3d at 113.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 124.
69 Id. at 118 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
70 Id.
71 See id. at 120.  There were more sinister official acts by Silver, but only the Assembly
resolution fell within the statute of limitations.  The Second Circuit made clear that the
only official act required to sustain a conviction was one that (1) fell within the McDonnell
framework, (2) fell within the statute of limitations, and (3) was an “action in furtherance
of the scheme.” Id. at 121–22.
72 Id. at 118; see also id. at 117 (listing the three instructions proposed by the McDonnell
Court); supra text accompanying notes 51–53.
73 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2362 (2016) (“McDonnell first met
Williams . . . when Williams offered McDonnell transportation on his private airplane to
assist with McDonnell’s election campaign.”).
74 See Silver, 864 F.3d at 106–09.
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bribes were paid to Silver because of his political position, but they were not
paid through political channels.75  The lesson from this is that, at least in the
Second Circuit, any conviction relying on official acts will require adherence
to the strictures of McDonnell’s holding.
In July 2018, more than two and a half years after his initial conviction,
Sheldon Silver was again found guilty and sentenced to seven years in
prison—a conviction that relied on largely the same evidence as was
presented in his first trial.76
B. United States v. Fattah
The second case worth examining is the corruption prosecution of for-
mer U.S. Congressman Chaka Fattah from Philadelphia.  Fattah had served
in the House of Representatives for over two decades at the time of his
twenty-two count federal indictment alleging pervasive corruption during his
tenure.77  The indictment, returned in July 2015, included counts of honest
services fraud and bribery.78  On June 21, 2017, just six days before the deci-
sion in McDonnell, a jury found Fattah guilty on all counts.79  Like Silver,
Fattah filed a post-trial motion seeking a judgment of acquittal relying on the
Court’s decision in McDonnell.80
In a lengthy opinion, the district court recognized that the jury instruc-
tions were erroneous in light of McDonnell, yet found that the error was harm-
less.81  Arriving at this holding, the court pointed to two alleged official acts
that “without any doubt” satisfied McDonnell’s requirements.82  First, during
the trial, prosecutors presented evidence that Fattah lobbied both Senator
Bob Casey and President Barack Obama to nominate his coconspirator as an
ambassador.83  In his post-trial motion, Fattah argued that “he did not
engage in official acts because as a Congressman he had no role in the nam-
75 This is not an ironclad distinction, since some of McDonnell’s bribes were paid
directly in the form of loans and gifts unrelated to campaign events.  However, the initial
alleged bribery with McDonnell had political origins, whereas with Silver it did not.
76 See Benjamin Weiser, Sheldon Silver, Ex-New York Assembly Speaker, Gets 7-Year Prison
Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/nyregion/
sheldon-silver-sentencing-prison-corruption.html.
77 United States v. Fattah, 223 F. Supp. 3d 336, 341–42 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (federal prose-
cutors alleged Fattah’s involvement in five different criminal schemes), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 902 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2018).
78 Id.
79 See id. at 342, 360.
80 See id. at 359–60.
81 Id. at 365–67.
82 Id. at 367.
83 See id. at 362.  The opinion thoroughly discusses the extreme efforts Fattah took to
secure the ambassadorship.  Among other efforts, Fattah wrote a letter strongly recom-
mending the coconspirator to Senator Casey.  Fattah then “set up a difficult-to-obtain tele-
phone conference . . . with . . . the President’s deputy chief of staff.” Id. To cap these
efforts off, Fattah hand delivered a “glowing letter of recommendation” directly to Presi-
dent Obama. Id.
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ing of ambassadors.”84  The district court rejected this argument, pointing to
the language in McDonnell that made it an official act to exert pressure on
another official with the intent that that official would take an official act.85
In reaching this conclusion, the district court distinguished between sending
a pro forma letter of support, and engaging in the extensive efforts that Fat-
tah took to secure an ambassadorship for his coconspirator.86  Fattah was not
“immunize[d]” by “[t]he fact that the House of Representatives has no con-
stitutional responsibility” to appoint ambassadors.87
The second official act that the district court identified was when Fattah
hired the same coconspirator’s girlfriend to work in his congressional
office.88  With respect to this official act, the district court found that McDon-
nell’s requirements were satisfied by the expenditure of taxpayer funds to
hire the woman onto Fattah’s staff.89  Unlike his efforts to obtain an ambassa-
dorship for the coconspirator, hiring the girlfriend “solely involved [Fattah’s]
own exercise of governmental power.”90
The Third Circuit was less sure that the jury instruction errors were
harmless, and reversed Fattah’s conviction on several bribery related charges.
In doing so, the court took a similar tone to the Second Circuit’s reversal of
Silver’s convictions.  While at least one of the three charged acts was “clearly
an official act,” the court could not be sure that the jury solely considered
that act when reaching its verdict.91  As it remanded for retrial on these
counts, the Third Circuit provided a useful discussion of McDonnell.  First, the
court noted a meeting Fattah arranged between his coconspirator and the
U.S. Trade Representative.92  This, the court said, was plainly the type of
activity that McDonnell placed outside the definition of an official act.93  If
McDonnell was clear on anything, it was that a meeting, standing alone, could
not constitute an official act.
84 Id.  Here, Fattah’s argument was based on the Constitution’s assignment of the
power to nominate ambassadors to the President, and the power to confirm those nomi-
nees to the Senate, and not the House of Representatives of which he was a member. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.




88 See id. at 362–63 (“Fattah’s decision to employ her was clearly a formal and focused
exercise of governmental power . . . .”).
89 See id. at 363.
90 Id.
91 United States v. Fattah, 902 F.3d 197, 238 (3d Cir. 2018).  The court further
explained that “[b]ecause the jury may have convicted Fattah for conduct that is not unlaw-
ful, we cannot conclude that the error in the jury instruction was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” Id. at 240.
92 See id. at 239.  Interestingly, the district court opinion made relatively little note of
this meeting. See Fattah, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 363 n.14.  But as the Third Circuit noted, a fair
reading of the indictment would lead a juror to believe this meeting was one of the alleged
official acts. See Fattah, 902 F.3d at 239.
93 See Fattah, 902 F.3d at 239.
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While the court of appeals found the meeting to clearly fall outside
McDonnell’s definition of official act, it found Fattah’s decision to hire the
girlfriend of his coconspirator to clearly meet the McDonnell requirements.94
Agreeing with the district court on this issue, the Third Circuit wrote that
“[o]fficial acts need not be momentous decisions—or even notable ones.”95
Despite this obvious official act, the imprecise jury instructions required
remand.96
Most notable was the appellate court’s discussion of Fattah’s attempt to
secure an ambassadorship for his coconspirator.  The court reiterated the
idea that the meetings with Senator Casey and President Obama were not, by
themselves, official acts.  Yet they might be “impermissible attempts ‘to pres-
sure or advise another official on a pending matter.’”97  The decision, how-
ever, is inherently “fact-intensive” and “falls within the domain of a properly
instructed jury.”98  The “cold record” did not afford the court the ability to
decide, “just how forceful a strongly worded letter of recommendation must
be” before it is considered impermissible pressure.99  Importantly, like the
district court, the Third Circuit placed significance on the hand delivered
letter to President Obama.100  The Third Circuit also made clear that this
type of “pressure” analysis should look at all of the relevant conduct, and not
isolate each individual action.101  As of this writing it remains to be seen if
Fattah will be retried on the vacated counts.  Regardless, the Third Circuit’s
opinion added clarity to the increasing body of post-McDonnell corruption
caselaw.  Like Silver, the reversal in Fattah stemmed from errors in the jury
instructions, and not from a fatal flaw in the Government’s proof.
C. United States v. Menendez
The third case that sheds some light on McDonnell’s impact is the prose-
cution of U.S. Senator Robert Menendez.  In late 2016, after the Court’s deci-
sion in McDonnell, federal prosecutors indicted the sitting New Jersey Senator
on a number of corruption charges.102  Among the counts listed in the
94 See id. at 241.
95 Id.
96 See id. at 242.
97 Id. at 241 (quoting McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371 (2016)).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See id. at 244 n.17 (“While we express doubt that some of Fattah’s efforts concerning
the ambassadorship are, when considered in isolation, enough to cross that line, a properly
instructed jury considering all of the facts in context might nonetheless conclude that
other efforts—such as a hand-delivered letter to the President of the United States—
indeed crossed that line.”).
101 See id. (“[A] jury might find that in the aggregate, three emails, two letters, and a
phone call crossed the line and therefore constituted a ‘decision or action’ on the identi-
fied matter of appointment.” (emphasis added)).
102 See generally Indictment, United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606 (D.N.J.
2018) (No. 15-cr-155). See also Paul Kane & Carol D. Leonnig, Sen. Robert Menendez Indicted
on Corruption Charges, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit-
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indictment were violations of the federal bribery statute and honest services
fraud.103  The Government alleged that Menendez engaged in a pattern of
corruption with his longtime friend, a Florida physician named Salomon
Melgen.  The case went to trial in late 2017, and eventually resulted in a
deadlocked jury that required the judge to declare a mistrial.104  In January
2018, the federal judge hearing the case granted in part, and denied in part,
Menendez’s motion to dismiss the charges against him.105  Following the dis-
missal of several of the charges against the Senator, the Department of Justice
decided to drop its case against Menendez.106
Although the prosecution of Senator Menendez did not result in a con-
viction, it offers a useful case study in how prosecutors can bring federal cor-
ruption cases after the McDonnell decision.  Unlike the cases against Silver
and Fattah, the entire Menendez prosecution occurred in the aftermath of
McDonnell.  The case against Menendez was the highest profile corruption
prosecution undertaken since the McDonnell decision.  Therefore, it may
indicate how McDonnell has changed prosecutorial strategy at both the indict-
ment and trial stages.
The case against Menendez alleged a long-running conspiracy between
the Senator and Melgen.  The trial judge, in denying part of the motion to
dismiss, focused his analysis on four specific alleged official acts.107  The first
official act was Menendez’s “visa-related advocacy” on behalf of Melgen’s
noncitizen girlfriend.108  The second was the Senator’s advocacy related to a
Medicare billing dispute between Melgen and the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”).109  Third was Menendez’s advocacy related to a
contract between a company owned by Melgen and the Dominican Republic
government for port security services.110  Fourth, and finally, was Menendez’s
advocacy on behalf of Melgen to the State Department, opposing a gift of
security equipment to the Dominican Republic by the United States, which
would have rendered Melgen’s previously mentioned contract useless.111
ics/menendez-expected-to-be-indicted-as-soon-as-wednesday-sources-say/2015/04/01/
623024c6-d86e-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html?utm_term=.D4f440495f02.
103 See Indictment, supra note 102; see also Superseding Indictment, Menendez, 291 F.
Supp. 3d 606 (No. 15-cr-155).
104 See, e.g., Laura Jarrett & Sarah Jorgensen, Bob Menendez Trial Ends in Mistrial After
Jury Deadlocks, CNN (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/16/politics/bob-
menendez-trial/index.html.
105 See Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 623 (dismissing several counts, but denying Menen-
dez’s motion to dismiss on official act grounds).
106 See Nick Corasaniti, Justice Department Dismisses Corruption Case Against Menendez, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/nyregion/justice-depart-
ment-moves-to-dismiss-corruption-case-against-menendez.html.
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The trial judge, responding to Menendez’s claim that the government
could not prove an official act, determined that a rational juror could have
found all four of the actions to be official acts.112  The analysis in the district
judge’s decision, like that by the district judge in Fattah, suggests that lower
courts will limit McDonnell’s impact to a narrow subset of cases.  In Menendez,
the judge held that interbranch lobbying can qualify as an official act under
McDonnell.113  Similar to the discussion of the ambassadorship in Fattah, the
decision that lobbying an executive branch official by a member of Congress
can be an official act emphasized the McDonnell holding that the charged
official does not himself need to “make a decision or take an action.”114  In
Menendez’s case, the interbranch lobbying, according to the trial judge, fit
with McDonnell’s language that the official act requirement can be satisfied
when an official “exerts pressure” on another official to take an act, or “pro-
vides advice” with the knowledge and intent that the advice will form the
basis of an official act.115
The trial court’s discussion of McDonnell’s holding in relation to inter-
branch lobbying is important in another way.  Among the official acts that
the trial court said a rational juror could find was Menendez’s lobbying of
various HHS and State Department officials.116  In the case of Menendez’s
lobbying of HHS officials to resolve a Medicare billing dispute for Melgen,
the official acts were a series of phone calls between Menendez’s staff and
HHS officials and an in-person meeting between Menendez and the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services.117  The court, in denying the motion to
dismiss on official act grounds, focused on the meeting between Menendez
and the Secretary.  Similarly, with regard to Menendez’s lobbying of State
Department officials on Melgen’s behalf, the court noted the fact that
Menendez met with an official “of ambassadorial rank.”118  The focus on
Menendez’s meetings with high-level officials suggests that this kind of out-of-
the-ordinary action by a high-level public official may be sufficient to consti-
tute “pressure” within the meaning of McDonnell.
III. MCDONNELL’S DEFINITION OF “OFFICIAL ACT” WILL HAVE
LIMITED IMPACT
In the aftermath of McDonnell, commentators suggested that the Court’s
narrowed definition of official act would spell an end to prosecuting corrupt
public officials.119  These fears focused on the Court’s holding in McDonnell
112 Id. at 617 (“In this case, there are four incidents from which a rational juror could
conclude official acts arise . . . .”).
113 See id. at 618–19.
114 See id. at 618.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 617.
117 See id. (noting the intent to exert pressure on these other officials to take an official
act).
118 Id.
119 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
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too generally, failing to recognize the intricacies of the Court’s reasoning.
The unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Roberts left more than enough
room for federal prosecutors to do their jobs.  Moreover, lower court deci-
sions, including decisions made at the trial court level discussed above, hint
at two distinct reasons McDonnell is not the death knell that commentators
predicted.
The first reason is that lower courts have readily found charged public
officials to have “exert[ed] pressure on another official” to take an official
act.120  This method of satisfying McDonnell’s requirement that the “official
make a decision or take an action”121 is what this Note will refer to as the
“pressure theory.”122  This is most apparent in Fattah and Menendez, where
the trial courts decided that persistent lobbying, albeit at a high level of gov-
ernment, constituted pressure with the intent to trigger an official act under
the Court’s holding in McDonnell.  In Fattah, the Third Circuit suggested that
Representative Fattah’s advocacy to Senator Casey and President Obama,
aimed at securing an ambassadorship for a coconspirator, could satisfy
McDonnell’s official act requirement.123  In Menendez, the district judge held
that a reasonable juror could find that Senator Menendez’s meeting with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services—to advocate for his coconspirator
in a Medicare billing dispute—constituted an official act.124  This finding in
Menendez was explicitly based on the McDonnell language about the charged
official exerting pressure on another.125
At first glance both Fattah and Menendez may seem to set a high bar for
finding an official act using McDonnell’s pressure theory.  After all, Fattah
hand delivered a letter to President Obama,126 and Senator Menendez went
out of his way to schedule an in-person meeting with a cabinet member, each
with the alleged hope of triggering an official act.  But it would be a mistake
to think that the pressure theory is difficult to satisfy, for two reasons.  First,
the district court in Fattah distinguished between sending a pro forma letter
on behalf of an individual—something an elected representative might be
expected to do frequently—and engaging in a more involved form of lobby-
ing another high-level government official in order pressure them into a
120 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2370 (2016).  The Court made clear,
however, that the official would have to intend to exert pressure. Id. at 2370–71.  Thus, the
pressure theory contains a mens rea element. See id.
121 Id. at 2371.
122 Though McDonnell and subsequent cases have not expressly used the term pressure
theory, the lower courts in the cases discussed in Part II have taken seriously the ability to
satisfy the official act requirement through evidence that proves the corrupt official
exerted pressure on another official with the intent that the other official take an official
act.
123 See United States v. Fattah, 902 F.3d 197, 244 (3d Cir. 2018).
124 See United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606, 617 (D.N.J. 2018).
125 See id.
126 See Fattah, 902 F.3d at 244 n.17 (placing significant weight on the unique nature of
Fattah’s conduct).
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decision.127  The Third Circuit, noting Fattah’s extensive advocacy on behalf
of his coconspirator, implicitly agreed with the district court on this point.128
If this line of reasoning develops across circuits, the question may become
whether the official advocated in a manner out of the ordinary (i.e., more
than pro forma) to pressure another official to take an action.  At the very
least, this gives prosecutors a baseline level of advocacy to judge the charged
official’s conduct against.
The second reason that McDonnell’s pressure theory will likely be satis-
fied in many cases flows from common sense.  Why is the coconspirator pay-
ing the bribe after all?  It is so that the public official makes calls, sends
letters, takes meetings, and otherwise uses his or her influence in a manner
above and beyond the typical constituent services he or she performs.  Why
pay the bribe if you could simply write your congressman to achieve the nec-
essary official act?  In bona fide cases of corruption, the quid is not paid so
that the official staffs out the quo.  If the corrupt official cannot take the
official act under his or her own authority, then he or she will necessarily
have to exert influence over another official.  This will likely involve taking
on the matter personally, which inherently makes any pressure the official
exerts well above that of pro forma advocacy.  The pressure theory, moreo-
ver, does not necessarily require the corrupt official to have leverage over the
other official.  In Fattah’s case, he did not have any actual leverage over Sena-
tor Casey or President Obama.  Yet the Third Circuit held that a properly
instructed jury may conclude that these actions satisfied McDonnell’s pressure
theory.  This further evidences the idea that when the corrupt official person-
ally gets involved—through a meeting, phone call, or other advocacy—in
triggering the official act, then McDonnell may be satisfied.
There are, of course, limits to this use of the pressure theory.129  The
Court in McDonnell noted that the pressure theory only works when the offi-
cial exerting pressure uses “his official position.”130  Thus, an official facing a
pressure theory prosecution may argue that he was not using his official posi-
tion when exerting pressure on another official to take an action.  Another
key criticism is that while the pressure theory may work well in corruption
cases against high-level officials, it may not help prove an official act in cases
127 See United States v. Fattah, 223 F. Supp. 3d 336, 362 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“[Fattah] did
not simply sign routine or pro forma letters of support . . . .”).
128 See Fattah, 902 F.3d at 244 n.17. But see id. at 241 (“Official acts need not be momen-
tous decisions—or even notable ones.”).
129 For an argument that the pressure theory will not be effective, see Eugene
Temchenko, Note, A First Amendment Right to Corrupt Your Politician, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
465, 478–79 (2018).
130 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2370 (2016) (“A public official may
also make a decision or take an action on a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy’ by using his official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an
‘official act.’  In addition, if a public official uses his official position to provide advice to
another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official
act’ by another official, that too can qualify as a decision or action for purposes of
§ 201(a)(3).” (first and third emphases added)).
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against mid-level or low-level public officials.  Demanding a personal meeting
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or handing a letter directly
to the President is one thing.  Demanding a personal meeting with a member
of the state liquor board, or hand delivering a letter to the director of the
regional development authority, might be another in the eyes of a juror.
Moreover, the pressure theory requires prosecutors prove the official acted
with the intent to influence.131  What is unclear is whether this will require
significantly more evidence than prosecutors would already need to prove
the separate intent element in the honest services and Hobbs Act extortion
statutes.132  More caselaw is needed before the boundaries of the pressure
theory become clear.  But two years after McDonnell, it has the potential to be
a major asset to federal prosecutors.
The second reason that McDonnell’s narrow official act definition will
have a limited impact is because it primarily changes how prosecutors frame
their theory of the case, rather than changing the underlying evidence they
will rely on. McDonnell’s impact will be most prevalent in cases where the
individual paying the bribe does not actually achieve their desired outcome.
Remember, in McDonnell, Jonnie Williams never received his scientific study.
In Fattah, the coconspirator was never nominated to be an ambassador.  In
Menendez, Melgen’s billing dispute with Medicare was not resolved by Senator
Menendez’s intervention.  Proving that an official act occurred, within the
meaning of McDonnell, will obviously be easier when the official act actually
occurs.133
McDonnell makes clear, however, that there is no requirement, at least
under the pressure theory, that the official act actually occurs.134  If the offi-
cial act requirement can be satisfied by proving that the official simply agreed
to make a decision or take an action on a qualifying matter, then what
McDonnell really changed is how prosecutors frame their case.  After McDon-
nell, prosecutors will no longer argue that a meeting, phone call, or event was
itself an official act.  Instead, McDonnell offers prosecutors two ways to argue
that those actions represent evidence of corruption.  The first is to argue that
the meeting, phone call, or event is evidence of the agreement to make a
131 See id. at 2370–71; Temchenko, supra note 129, at 478.
132 See Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 473–74 (discussing the intent elements in those
statutes); see also infra Part V.
133 See Arlo Devlin-Brown & Stephen Dee, Introduction: The Shifting Sands of Public Cor-
ruption, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 979, 985–86 (2017) (“The reality is that McDonnell only pre-
cludes prosecutions where the government’s theory is that the public official agreed to
provide preferential access rather than an actual exercise of governmental power.”).
134 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370–71 (“[A] public official is not required to actually
make a decision or take an action on a question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or contro-
versy; it is enough that the official agree to do so.  The agreement need not be explicit, and
the public official need not specify the means that he will use to perform his end of the
bargain.  Nor must the public official in fact intend to perform the official act, so long as
he agrees to do so.” (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted)); see also United
States v. Fattah, 902 F.3d 197, 246 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming Fattah’s conviction on a count
that alleged his agreement to misappropriate funds).
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decision or take an action.135  The second method is for a prosecutor to
argue those actions are evidence of an effort to exert pressure on another
official to take an official act.136  The evidence would likely remain the same.
What changes is how the prosecution frames the case.
The sameness of the evidence before and after the decision is important
to understanding the impact of McDonnell.  In the aftermath of McDonnell
prosecutors still brought high-profile corruption cases, and the evidence
largely mirrored the type of evidence used in similar cases preceding McDon-
nell.137  In fact, immediately following the McDonnell decision, federal prose-
cutors announced their intent to retry Governor McDonnell.138  The
prosecution would have presumably used the evidence of meetings, phone
calls, and events as evidence of the intent to pressure state officials into tak-
ing the official action of initiating a research study.
The case against Senator Menendez, brought entirely after the decision
in McDonnell, provides an example of this shift in framing.  One critical piece
of the indictment was Senator Menendez’s meeting with the Secretary of
HHS to advocate on behalf of Melgen in his Medicare billing dispute.139
Prosecutors framed this meeting not as an official act in and of itself, but
rather as evidence of Menendez’s alleged effort to pressure the Secretary to
take an official act to benefit Melgen.  Though the trial court eventually dis-
missed several counts of the indictment, the Government’s use of the pres-
sure theory regarding the meeting with the Secretary of HHS survived a
motion to dismiss.140  In response to post-trial motions following the McDon-
nell decision, the Fattah trial court found similar framing persuasive.  There,
135 See Devlin-Brown & Dee, supra note 133, at 986.  The meetings, phone calls, and
events at issue in McDonnell would be useful evidence of the intent to agree to take an
official act. See George D. Brown, McDonnell and the Criminalization of Politics, 5 VA. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 30 (2017); see also Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 476 n.85.
136 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
137 Compare Superseding Indictment, United States v. Percoco, 2017 WL 6314146
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2017) (No. 16-cr-776) (indicting a senior aide to the New York Governor
after McDonnell), with Superseding Indictment, United States v. Silver, 184 F. Supp. 3d 33
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 15-cr-093) (indicting the New York Assembly Speaker prior to
McDonnell).
138 See Matt Zapotosky et al., Prosecutors Will Drop Cases Against Former Va. Governor Robert
McDonnell, Wife, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pub-
lic-safety/prosecutors-will-drop-case-against-former-va-gov-robert-mcdonnell/2016/09/08/
a19dc50a-6878-11e6-ba32-5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html?utm_term=.Bf062041ec4a (“The U.S.
attorney’s office . . . had pushed to move forward and retry the McDonnells” even after the
Court’s decision).
139 Superseding Indictment, supra note 103, at 49.
140 See United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606, 617 (D.N.J. 2018) (“There is
evidence to support the conclusion that . . . with various representatives of Medicare and
with cabinet officials, Menendez sought to pressure or advise such officials to look at the
controversy favorably to Melgen by making personal phone calls to officials in the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services . . . and meeting with the then-secretary of that
agency in August 2012.  There is evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that
the meeting was not regarding general policy matters, but was in reality about securing a
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the court denied a motion to dismiss, noting that while Fattah’s conduct in
taking a meeting with high-level officials, including the President and Sena-
tor Casey, was not independently an official act, it was evidence of Fattah
exerting pressure to trigger an official act by those officials.141
The notion that McDonnell only changed the way prosecutors frame
cases is not entirely without criticism.  What a prosecutor frames as an exer-
tion of pressure in order to achieve an official act may appear to a rational
juror to simply be constituent services.  Not every case will present facts like
those in Fattah or Menendez.  But commentators ringing the death knell of
anticorruption efforts in the aftermath of McDonnell were not concerned
about the borderline cases where it is impossible to truly distinguish between
exerting pressure and performing constituent services.  Rather, they were
concerned about cases where high-level officials used their power to make
government work for those who paid. McDonnell’s narrower definition of
official act will not greatly impact the outcome in those cases.  Certainly,
prosecutors will have to rewrite some of their playbook, but they will not have
to rewrite the book from scratch.
IV. THE “STREAM OF BENEFITS” THEORY OF CORRUPTION IS
UNAFFECTED BY MCDONNELL
Prosecutors have long used the “stream of benefits” theory to bring com-
plex corruption cases, and lower courts have largely approved of this tac-
tic.142  The theory alleviates the need to link each individual quid to a
specific and contemporaneous quo.143  In the aftermath of McDonnell,
defendants began to argue that the Court rejected the steam of benefits the-
ory when it announced the narrower definition of an official act.144  Scholar-
ship following McDonnell similarly questioned the theory’s continued
favorable ruling or decision for Melgen, who was the only doctor seeking to change that
particular policy, and who had $8.9 million at stake.” (citations omitted)).
141 United States v. Fattah, 223 F. Supp. 3d 336, 362–64 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing United
States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2007)), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 902 F.3d 197
(3d Cir. 2018).
142 See JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 480–81 (6th ed. 2016);
George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption: With a Note on
Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of Politics, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 177, 221
(2015) (“The stream-of-benefits cases show a particularly aggressive attitude toward corrup-
tion on the part of the lower courts.”); see also United States v. Lopez-Cotto, 884 F.3d 1, 8
n.5 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[T]he case law on ‘stream of benefits’ mostly involves cases of honest
services fraud . . . [and] program bribery [under 18 U.S.C. § 666].”).
143 See Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of Bribery Make
Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 479–82 (2015) (criticizing the stream of benefits
theory).
144 See, e.g., Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
McDonnell v. United States at 1–7, United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606 (D.N.J.
2018) (No. 15-cr-155).
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validity.145  Yet no court addressing this argument at either the trial or appel-
late level has found McDonnell to have foreclosed use of the steam of benefits
theory.146
This Note argues that these courts are correct in deciding that there is
nothing in McDonnell that is inconsistent with the stream of benefits theory of
corruption.147  The stream of benefits theory focuses on the relationship
between the quid and the quo.  It does not in any way alleviate the need to
prove that either occurred.  Questions about the soundness of the stream of
benefits theory rest not on whether there needs to be an official act, but
rather on the exchange of valuable consideration for an official act. McDon-
nell, as courts have rightly noted, did not focus on the exchange element, but
on the definition of official act.148  Importantly, lower courts have built up a
body of caselaw on the stream of benefits theory, which they have continued
to rely on in the aftermath of McDonnell.149
The trial courts in Menendez and Fattah, as well as the circuit court in
Silver, had an opportunity to address the continuing viability of the stream of
benefits theory.  In Menendez, the district judge completely rejected the
notion that McDonnell foreclosed the theory.150  There, the defense argued
that McDonnell “requires the Government to prove . . . that [Menendez] had
an agreement to exchange a specific quid for a specific, identified quo.”151
The court pointed to Third Circuit precedent that a course of conduct of
gifts and favors can satisfy the quid pro quo requirement, as long as that
145 Compare Harvey A. Silverglate & Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt? McDonnell
Fails to Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 189,
207–08 (arguing McDonnell “silently rejected” the stream of benefits theory), with Adam F.
Minchew, Note, Who Put the Quo in Quid Pro Quo?: Why Courts Should Apply McDonnell’s
“Official Act” Definition Narrowly, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1793, 1825 (2017).
146 This proposition is based on the results of Westlaw searches of cases citing McDon-
nell, containing the search terms “stream of benefits” and separately “retain!.”  The latter
search is a reference to the “retainer theory,” which is analogous to the stream of benefits
theory.  For a brief description of the different terms used by courts describing the stream
of benefits theory of corruption, see Brown, supra note 142, at 218.
147 This is not to say, however, that no Supreme Court precedent calls into question the
validity of the stream of benefits theory.  This Note merely argues that McDonnell has no
effect on the theory.
148 See, e.g., United States v. Silver, No. 15-cr-93, 2018 WL 1406617, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
20, 2018) (“Silver is mistaken when he argues that McDonnell found the ‘retainer’ or ‘as
opportunities arise’ theory of bribery impermissible. McDonnell held only that the matter
on which official action is ultimately taken must be specific and focused . . . .”); see also
Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 472 (critically noting that “[t]he Court’s opinion evaluates
the definition of ‘official act’ as though it were the sole limitation on the sweep of the
anticorruption regime”).
149 For examples of the pre-McDonnell caselaw in several circuits, see United States v.
Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.
2007); United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Alschuler, supra note
143, at 479–80 (discussing the major stream of benefits cases).
150 United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606, 613–19 (D.N.J. 2018).
151 Id. at 614.
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pattern of behavior is “in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to
the donor.”152  Cutting to the crux of the argument, the judge noted that
“[a]s long as that action is an ‘official act’ under McDonnell, it is a crime.”153
Similarly, in Fattah, there was a presumption that the stream of benefits the-
ory was unaffected by McDonnell.  There, the court noted with approval the
Government’s proof that Fattah engaged in a pattern of receiving gifts and
favors in exchange for favorable action on behalf of the coconspirator.154
Like the district court in Menendez, the Fattah opinion cites prior stream of
benefits circuit precedent without any hint that McDonnell has fundamentally
altered the theory.155  Because the prosecution is still required to prove an
official act took place, now using the McDonnell definition, the stream of ben-
efits theory remains viable.156
Several recent decisions out of the Second Circuit further bolster the
belief that McDonnell did not alter the stream of benefits theory.157  These
cases provide critical insight into the use of the theory going forward,
because they primarily rely on then-Judge Sotomayor’s opinion in United
States v. Ganim,158 one of the most cited stream of benefits cases.  Though
Ganim was decided prior to McDonnell, courts both inside and outside of the
Second Circuit have continued to cite it as thoroughly persuasive on the
issue.159  In a recent corruption case brought against a county executive and
town supervisor, Judge Joan Azrack of the Eastern District of New York cited
to Ganim and rejected the notion that McDonnell altered the stream of bene-
fits theory.160  In another recent prosecution of a New York public official,
Judge Valerie Caproni of the Southern District of New York similarly cited
Ganim with continued approval, stating that “McDonnell [d]id [n]ot
[i]nvalidate the [r]etainer [t]heory of [b]ribery.”161
152 Id. (quoting Kemp, 500 F.3d at 282).
153 Id. (noting that “[o]ther Circuits agree” on this point).
154 See United States v. Fattah, 223 F. Supp. 3d 336, 362 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Kemp,
500 F.3d at 282), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 902 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2018).
155 See id. (citing Kemp, 500 F.3d at 282).  Though the Third Circuit opinion in Fattah
did not discuss the stream of benefits theory in detail, it did note the Government’s use of
the theory at trial.  The opinion did not couple these brief references with any hint that
the theory was undercut by McDonell. See Fattah, 902 F.3d at 242–43.
156 This includes the notion that the government can satisfy the official act require-
ment using the pressure theory or by proving an agreement with the knowledge and intent
to trigger an official act by another.
157 See United States v. Mangano, No. 16-cr-540, 2018 WL 851860, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
9, 2018); United States v. Percoco, No. 16-cr-776, 2017 WL 6314146, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
11, 2017); see also United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733, 738–39 (2d Cir. 2017).
158 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.).
159 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Cotto, 884 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v.
Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606, 614–15 (D.N.J. 2018).
160 See Mangano, 2018 WL 851860, at *4 (“[Defendant] appears to assert that the
stream-of-benefits theory is no longer viable after (or is at least limited by) McDonnell. . . .
To the extent that [defendant] is raising such an argument, the Court rejects it.  As multi-
ple courts have held, McDonnell did not eliminate the stream-of-benefits theory.”).
161 Percoco, 2017 WL 6314146, at *4.
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These are, of course, district court decisions, and thus could not over-
rule Ganim even if they wanted.  But they offer useful evidence that the
stream of benefits theory is alive and well in the fact that they refused to limit
the theory in the aftermath of McDonnell.  Further evidence for the contin-
ued viability of the theory is found in the fact that neither the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision in United States v. Silver,162 nor United States v. Skelos,163 hinted
at a desire to revisit Ganim in light of McDonnell.  As noted, other circuits
have cited to Ganim, and the stream of benefits theory generally, with
approval as well.  A recent example comes from the First Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Lopez-Cotto, which upheld a conviction that relied on a stream
of benefits theory.164
Perhaps the most prominent argument that McDonnell overturned the
stream of benefits theory derives not from anything the Court said, but rather
what it did not say.165  This argument goes, in part, that because the Court in
Skilling v. United States166 favorably cited stream of benefits cases like Ganim,
the absence of such favorable citations in McDonnell signals a change in the
Court’s approval of the theory.167  Further, the proponents of this argument
state that because McDonnell requires identification of a specific official act, it
is inconsistent with the stream of benefits theory.168  The argument that
McDonnell “silently rejected” the stream of benefits theory is grasping at
straws.  Those making this argument are, however, correct on one point:
McDonnell was certainly silent on the stream of benefits theory.  Not only was
there no mention of it in the opinion itself,169 but there was also no mention
in the parties’ briefs.170  Of the eighteen amicus briefs filed in the case, only
one makes a reference to the stream of benefits theory.171  This was not one
of the briefs cited in the McDonnell opinion, and there is nothing that would
162 See generally United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 110–12 (2d Cir. 2017).
163 See generally United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733 (2d Cir. 2017).
164 See Lopez-Cotto, 884 F.3d at 8–9 (citing United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 149 (2d
Cir. 2007)).  Though Lopez-Cotto involves a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 666, which does
not contain the same official act requirement as the honest services fraud or Hobbs Act
extortion, courts have treated the stream of benefits theory as applying in to federal brib-
ery-related crimes generally, and the Lopez-Cotto court did not note any distinction between
the theory’s application to § 666 cases and other bribery crimes as a result of McDonnell.
See, e.g., Percoco, 2017 WL 6314146, at *4.
165 See Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 145, at 207–08.
166 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
167 See Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 145, at 207 n.76 (citing Skilling and several
stream of benefits cases mentioned in that opinion).
168 See id. at 207–08.
169 See generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
170 See generally Brief for Petitioner, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474); Brief for
the United States, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474); Reply Brief for Petitioner,
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474).
171 See Brief of Amici Curiae Public Policy Advocates and Business Leaders in Support
of Petitioner at 16–17, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474).
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make one think that the brief’s relatively sparse discussion of the stream of
benefits led to the theory’s downfall.172
It is simply too difficult to tell why the Court cited stream of benefits
cases in Skilling and not in McDonnell.  Perhaps, given the political nature of
the case, the Court prized unanimity in McDonnell in a manner it did not in
Skilling.  Perhaps the Court thought that defining official act simply did not
implicate the stream of benefits theory the way that the holding in Skilling
did.  It is impossible to tell.  An equally “fair reading” would be that the
court’s silence, especially on an important prosecutorial tool against corrup-
tion, silently affirms the theory.173
Undoubtedly a case will arise that cleanly presents whether McDonnell
has altered the availability of the stream of benefits theory of corruption.  But
with nearly two years of corruption cases since the McDonnell decision, lower
courts across the board have approved of the theory’s use.  This Note argues
that those courts are correct, because they rightly note that McDonnell rede-
fined an existing element—an official act—rather than added an entirely
new element.  Prosecutors had to prove an official act before McDonnell, and
they have to prove one after.  The stream of benefits theory is simply one
means of proving corruption under the honest services fraud or Hobbs Act
extortion statutes.  Defendants facing corruption charges likely will continue
to attack the stream of benefits theory when used against them.  And there
may well be some yet undiscovered rationale for attacking the stream of ben-
efits theory.  But a fair reading of McDonnell, and the lower court decisions
that followed, make clear that McDonnell does not offer any assistance to
those defendants.
V. PROVING INTENT REMAINS THE PRIMARY OBSTACLE IN CORRUPTION CASES
The dire commentary in the aftermath of McDonnell resulted far more
from the judgment of the Court than the reasoning.  The Court’s sole focus
in McDonnell was the official act element of the federal bribery statute.  There
will, of course, be cases that are affected by the McDonnell Court’s narrowing
of this element; however, the reality is that other elements of the bribery
statute remain the greater source of headaches for federal prosecutors.  As
one commentator wrote shortly after the McDonnell decision, “[t]he Court’s
opinion evaluates the definition of ‘official act’ as though it were the sole
limitation on the sweep of the anticorruption regime.”174  Yet, the true scope
of the bribery statute is much narrower.  Section 201 “lays out the five parts of
a bribe: (1) a public official (2) with corrupt intent (3) receives a benefit (4)
given with the intent to influence (5) an official act.”175  There are also fur-
ther elemental limitations found in the honest services fraud and the Hobbs
172 See generally McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355.
173 See Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 145, at 207.
174 Leading Cases, supra note 22, at 472.
175 Id. at 473 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)).
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Act extortion statutes.176  In corruption prosecutions, the official act element
relates to the actus reus—what the official must do.  Yet it is not the actus
reus element that is the primary limiting principle in corruption cases, but
rather the mens rea.  Proving corrupt intent is what separates political action
or constituent services from corruption.  It is thus the intent element where
the case is typically won or lost.177
After McDonnell, the highest hurdle facing federal prosecutors is the
same as it was before McDonnell: proving corrupt intent.178  The Menendez
case is a good example of this fact.  The prosecution was not doomed by a
legal judgment that Senator Menendez’s alleged interbranch lobbying could
not have constituted an official act under McDonnell.  Rather, the difficulty
was in proving that Menendez had the requisite corrupt intent when he lob-
bied on behalf of Melgen, his longtime friend.179  But this difficulty would
have existed even absent the Court’s decision in McDonnell.  Though Menen-
dez is only one data point, it is notable that in the first major corruption
prosecution following McDonnell the main issue confronting prosecutors was
nothing new.
Nor can it be said that McDonnell added much, if anything, to the task of
proving intent.  As discussed in Part III, the pressure theory that can be used
to satisfy McDonnell’s official act definition, contains a separate mens rea.  It
requires that there be proof that the official acted with the intent to exert
pressure.180  What remains to be seen is whether this pressure theory mens
rea will place a greater evidentiary burden on prosecutors, or whether evi-
dence proving the separate statutory intent element will tend to prove the
pressure theory’s intent requirement as well.  It is difficult to conjure a scena-
rio where an official who exerts some kind of pressure to trigger an official
act does so with corrupt intent but without the intent to exert pressure.181
Proving the former was a pre-McDonnell requirement, proving the latter is
what McDonnell added via the pressure theory.182  At the end of the day, it is
not proving an official act that will substantially hinder corruption prosecu-
176 See Brennan T. Hughes, The Crucial “Corrupt Intent” Element in Federal Bribery Laws, 51
CAL. W. L. REV. 25, 44–46 (2014) (discussing the Hobbs Act extortion and honest services
fraud intent elements).
177 See id. at 53 (“By requiring an ‘evil state of mind’ to satisfy corrupt intent, the law
criminalizes corrupt behavior without criminalizing more benign political behavior . . .
which neither corrupt public officials nor betray public trust.”).
178 See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 566–70
(2015) (discussing the difficulty of proving intent in corruption cases).
179 For a thorough commentary on the Menendez case, see Randall Eliason, The State of
Public Corruption Law After Menendez, SIDEBARS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://sidebarsblog.com/
why-difficult-prosecute-public-corruption/.
180 See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
181 Indeed, the Third Circuit’s discussion of the pressure theory in Fattah did not even
reference the theory’s intent requirement. See United States v. Fattah, 902 F.3d 197,
240–41 (3d Cir. 2018).
182 See Hughes, supra note 176, at 44–46 (discussing the pre-McDonnell intent
requirements).
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tions, but rather proving the requisite intent—something that has long
stymied corruption prosecutions.
CONCLUSION
When it was decided, McDonnell threatened to upend public corruption
convictions and investigations throughout the country.  Indeed, in some
cases, McDonnell resulted in convictions being overturned.  But a deeper anal-
ysis of the lower courts’ reasoning in post-McDonnell corruption cases reveals
a different story.  This story is one that is far more nuanced than the initial
reactions to the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the term official act.
The Court’s language in McDonnell did, as Chief Justice Roberts assured,
“leave[ ] ample room for prosecuting corruption.”183
Particularly important was the Court’s articulation of what this Note has
called the pressure theory.  This theory allows prosecutors to reframe existing
cases, no longer arguing that meetings, phone calls, and events are official
acts in and of themselves, but rather evidence of intentional pressure on
another official to take an official act.  This Note also argued that McDonnell
left the often-used stream of benefits theory of corruption untouched.  There
has been some scholarly debate on this issue, yet courts have upheld the the-
ory across the board.  Finally, this Note argued that proving corrupt intent,
not a narrower definition of official act, is the primary issue plaguing corrup-
tion prosecutions.  What remains after these three arguments is the realiza-
tion that McDonnell has had a limited effect on corruption prosecutions, and
is far from the death knell that it was originally touted to be.
183 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016).
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